

Theses on the October Defeat and on the Present Situation.

By A. Thalheimer and H. Brandler.

I. On the October Defeat.

1. The October retreat was unavoidable and justified.
2. The fundamental causes of the October defeat are of an objective nature and are not due to essential tactical mistakes on the part of the CP. of Germany. The decisive cause is the influence of the Social Democratic Party still being too strong and hampering. The majority of the working class was no longer ready to fight for the November Democracy, from which it no longer derived any material advantage, and was not yet ready to fight for the Soviet Dictatorship and for Socialism.

Or in other words: the majority of the working class was not yet won over for Communism.

3. The mistake, common to the EC. of the CI. as well to the Central Committee of the CP. of Germany, was the false estimation of the proportion of forces within the working class between the SP. and CP. of Germany.

The CP. of Germany adopted a critical attitude in this respect towards the E. C. C. I. but not energetic enough. The E. C. C. I. has not attached sufficient importance to this criticism.

4. The consequences of this false estimation of the proportion of forces were:

- a) The fixing of a too early date for the final struggle.
- b) Neglect of the partial struggles and of the political preparation.
- c) As a result of the lack of connection between the political and technical preparations, the military-technical preparations also suffered.

5. Defects of a second and third category were:

- a) In Saxony and Thuringia insufficient exploitation of the given positions in regard to disintegration of the Social Democratic Party, attracting SP. workers into the CP. as well as to organizing military defence.
- b) Clumsiness in the organisatory adaptation of the party for the task of civil war.

6. All these mistakes and defects do not essentially alter the fundamental relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

II. On the Present Situation.

1. The military dictatorship of Seeckt bases itself socially on heavy industry and the great agrarians. It tries to subordinate the independent movement of the middle classes (petty bourgeois Fascism), partly by concessions and partly by repressions. It attempts to retain and to deepen the division of the working class into fractions, on the one hand by maintaining the appearance of bourgeois democracy and thereby winning over the SP. as defence troops, and on the other hand by repressions against the CP. of Germany.

2. The duration of the military dictatorship depends upon:

- a) The possibility to re-establish a temporary economic equilibrium by increased exploitation of the working class and of the middle classes, by reduction of expenditure and by requisite payment of taxes by the possessing classes. The first two measures are possible owing to the present conditions of power, the latter one is problematical and will be decisive.

- b) The pace of winning over the majority of the workers for Communism and of disintegrating and neutralizing the middle classes.

3. The pace of the renewed objective aggravation of the situation cannot yet be estimated. At all events a general sharpening of the class antagonisms and struggles must be expected.

4. The rate of winning over of the majority of the workers for Communism depends upon the Communist Party of Germany. All forces are to be concentrated on the political and organizational liquidation of the Socialist Party of Germany.

5. The political platform of this liquidation is:

Negative: destruction of the democratic and social reformist illusions.

Positive: winning over of the workers for the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship and for socialism.

6. With this work of propagation of principles and criticism there must be combined political, economic and military partial struggles. The decisive struggle is the culmination and the resultant of these partial struggles.

7. The next task: obtaining liberty of movement (in the streets etc.) by revolutionary mass action (at first by peaceful and armed demonstrations strikes armed and protected meetings etc.).

8. Transference of the organizational centre of gravity into the shop nuclei.

9. Increasing the activity and discipline in the Party. Elimination of passive elements from the Party, at the same time closer connections with the broad masses.

Session of the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International, followed by a Special Conference of the Communist Party of Germany.